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Abstract 
Libertarian paternalism (LP), a term which refers to the practice of “nudging” consumers into 
making “good” decisions, has grown steadily in popularity in recent years as an alternative to 
sin taxes and other traditional forms of paternalism. Critics however believe that relying on 
psychological manipulation is inherently unethical as consumers are typically unaware of the 
nudge and the intention behind it.  While proponents of LP insist that they want LP interventions 
to be conducted in an ethical manner, there is so far little evidence that LP interventions, when 
conducted in such a manner, still have the desired effect. In this paper I introduce the term 
Marginal Cost of Transparency (MCoT), the difference in treatment effect of an LP and what I 
call a Transparent Libertarian Paternalism (TLP) intervention; a type of LP intervention where 
consumers are made aware of the nudge and why it is there. The results indicate that the MCoT 
is not statistically significant from zero and that the answer to the question “Do honest nudges 
work?” is Yes. Moreover, the results indicate that Autonomy-enhancing paternalism (AEP), a 
type of paternalist interventions that work to enhance the autonomy of consumers (mainly by 
providing information) and unlike LP do not rely on psychological manipulation, fares at least 
as well as the LP/TLP treatments when stakes are high. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the term was coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2003), libertarian paternalism has been a 
topic of debate among behavioral economists. The term refers to measures that intend to 
change consumer behavior for their own good (paternalism) without using coercive means 
(that is, using a “libertarian” approach). It can be thought of as an umbrella term, 
incorporating various types of so called “nudges”: Changing the order of items on a menu, 
changing the default option on a corporate pension plan (from opt-in to opt-out) and 
informing people in a neighborhood of their neighbors’ consumption patterns (such as how 
much energy the average person in their neighborhood uses) are just a few examples. 
Although libertarian paternalism has been embraced by policymakers in several countries as 
an easy way to “fix” consumer behaviors that they perceive as flawed, libertarian paternalism 
has been met with far from universal acclaim in the academic community with critics 
questioning everything from the suitability of the term itself, to the efficacy and ethics of the 
methods used.  
In this paper I conduct an experiment with the ostensible goal of inducing consumers to make 
more patient choices. As previously stated, for a nudge to be considered ethical the bias it 
corrects has to have been conclusively proven to be harmful. In the case of discount rates, it 
can be noted that a high discount rate is associated with among other things obesity (Komlos, 
Smith and Bogin, 2004), drug addiction (Kirby and Petry, 2004) and risky sexual behaviors 
(Chesson et al, 2006), all of which are known to negatively affect a person’s physical and 
mental well-being.  I measure the MCoT by assigning participants to four different groups: 
An LP group, a TLP group, an AEP group and a control group. Conducting an experiment 
with random assignment allows for the effects of the LP and TLP treatments to be compared 
directly. The reason for including an AEP treatment in the experiment is that AEP is another 
potentially viable ethically superior alternative to LP.  
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One criticism leveled by Binder and Lades (2015), among others, is that most forms of 
libertarian paternalism use psychological manipulation and the exploitation of biases to 
achieve the goal of the “choice architect” (the policymaker designing the nudge), and usually 
without the consumer being aware of the nudge or why it is there. For example, while workers 
being enrolled in an opt-out retirement saving plan will be informed that they are being 
enrolled and be provided with information regarding the plan, the same cannot be said for 
consumers visiting a restaurant whose menu has been designed to induce them to choose the 
salad over the burger.  
Binder and Lades (2015) proposed an alternative they named Autonomy-Enhancing 
Paternalism (AEP). AEP is technically a subset of LP but with stricter criteria: In order for an 
intervention to qualify under the AEP umbrella, the intervention cannot rely on the 
exploitation of psychological biases; instead it must enhance the individual’s autonomy (the 
ability to make a conscious decision) by, for example, providing more information (public 
service announcements, nutrition labels on menus, etc.) or by preventing an individual from 
making a hasty decision by, for example, introducing a mandatory waiting period between the 
purchase and delivery of a good/service (such as a payday loan) during which the individual 
can cancel the purchase. Common forms of libertarian paternalism such as changing the 
default option to the option the choice architect wants the consumer to choose is off limit 
under AEP, as is the use of framing in the menu example. Felsen, Castelo and Reiner (2013) 
showed that AEP interventions in general were more acceptable to consumers than LP 
interventions. Decisions taken under AEP interventions were described by participants are 
more “authentic” which supports the idea that LP not only infringes on autonomy but does so 
in a way that reduces utility.  
In summary, one may say that while AEP at its core relies implicitly on the assumption of 
classic liberalism that consumers will do what is best for them if given all the necessary 
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information and enough time to make a decision, LP is based on the more pessimistic view 
common among behavioral economists where consumers cannot be relied on to make good 
decisions even if provided with full information.   
While AEP has a clear ethical advantage over LP, it is not without disadvantages: It is 
conceivable that providing nutrition information on restaurant menus could cause a loss of 
utility for all consumers who are buying high (or even moderate) calorie meals even if their 
action is rational, by inducing guilt and/or shame that may not be rational. While these 
consumers may be aware that they are eating an unhealthy meal, having the nutrition 
information “pushed down their throats” may put a damper on the mood even if the meal is 
for example part of the celebration of a special occasion. Such an AEP intervention could also 
serve to worsen the conditions of those who suffer from eating disorders such as anorexia who 
are prone to obsess about the calories in the foods they consume. It is an open question what 
information consumers need to make good choices (and who is capable of deciding that and 
why), and what to do if different sets of consumers need different information (i.e. anorectics 
who do not need calorie information). This of course is a recurring problem in public policy 
when different groups require different things, but the same thing has to be applied to 
everyone, and neither AEP nor LP escapes from this dilemma (it is neither possible to provide 
nutrition labels only to those who need them, or to set the default option differently for 
different individuals). 
Lusk (2014) criticizes libertarian paternalism by arguing that consumers in the real world 
have an incentive to self-regulate by engaging in activities that prevent their biases from 
harming them, such as by having their pension fund contributions directly deducted from their 
paychecks to ensure they do not accidentally spend that money. Lusk (2014) argues that 
nudges reduce (or even eliminate) the incentive to self-regulate, and consumers may come to 
rely on nudges to prevent them from making bad choices. This criticism may however also to 
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some extent apply to AEP interventions, as consumers may come to expect any potentially 
(not just obviously) harmful products or services to come with information detailing the 
hazardous effects.  
Furthermore, as Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) points out, behavioral economists too often act 
like their neoclassical counterparts by ignoring the process that leads to a consumer decision 
being made. This is especially relevant when designing AEP interventions; what information 
should be provided, and at what stage? Simply running regressions may not necessarily tell us 
that.  
Hence while AEP solves some of the ethical issues associated with libertarian paternalism, to 
apply it in an effective way may often require more information (that in some cases may not 
be available) than traditional nudges.  
In their book Nudge (2003) Thaler and Sunstein assure the readers that they want nudging to 
be carried out in an ethical, transparent manner (they do not describe in any further detail 
what they mean by this). Curiously, however, they do not further define what an ethical nudge 
looks like, or what the “red lines” are that choice architects are not allowed to cross lest their 
nudges become unethical. Furthermore, the vast majority of nudging case studies they present 
to bolster their case lack any semblance of transparency, and there is no way to know whether 
the nudges would work as well or at all, had the choice architects been transparent about their 
work and intentions.  
While Thaler and Sunstein (2003) do not define what an ethical nudge is, it is a question 
worth asking. An ethical nudge should be transparent, meaning the nudge is designed in such 
a way that consumers can tell that the nudge is there, why it is there, and have a clear path 
towards choosing another option than the one they are nudged towards. Finally, it should be 
correcting a bias (or other behavior) that has been conclusively proven to reduce utility. The 
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question remains however whether or not a nudge designed in this manner remains capable of 
altering consumer choices.  
If it is in fact the case that transparency does not harm the efficacy of a nudge, then this 
provides a potential “third option”, a compromise of sorts between the LP and AEP approach: 
Honest nudging, or Transparent Libertarian Paternalism (TLP). A TLP intervention would be 
identical to an LP intervention, with the exception that consumers are explicitly informed (for 
example through a written disclaimer) that they are being nudged and why. This approach 
solves one of the major ethical issues with LP which is the lack of transparency and by 
extension lack of accountability of the choice architects.  
The question remains however whether or not hidden nudges outperform transparent nudges, 
and if so to what extent. This defines the “Marginal Cost of Transparency” (MCoT), the 
difference between the treatment effect of a standard libertarian paternalist treatment and a 
transparent libertarian paternalist treatment. 
As previously mentioned the experiment I conducted had three treatment groups (LP, TLP 
and AEP) and one control group: In the LP treatment group the default option was set to the 
larger-later option, meaning participants had to make an active choice (by checking a box) in 
order to receive the smaller-sooner option. The TLP treatment was identical except for a 
disclaimer in capital letters informing participants of the nudge and why it was there. This 
was done to allow consumers to retain a greater degree of autonomy which would be lost had 
they unknowingly been manipulated into choosing a certain option. In the AEP treatment 
there was no default option but participants are instead provided with a list of arguments in 
favor of choosing the larger-later option (the arguments and the disclaimer message can both 
be found in the appendix). In the control group there was no default option nor are 
participants provided with any arguments in favor of either option.  
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This study tests two main hypotheses: First of all that the TLP treatment will be statistically 
insignificant; in other words that transparency renders a nudge useless. Secondly, that the 
difference between the LP and AEP treatment will be statistically insignificant. 
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2. Methodology 
To test the hypotheses regarding the relative efficacy of first and foremost TLP and LP and 
secondly LP/AEP I conducted an online experiment between the 18th of October and the 17th 
of November 2016. In total 1552 participants completed the experiment. Participants were 
mainly recruited through social media including Facebook, Reddit and Twitter, as well as the 
Swedish news website Avpixlat and an email invitation sent out to all students at the 
Department of Finance, Economics & Accounting at Maynooth University.  
The incentive structure of this experiment was similar to the one developed by Coller and 
Williams (1999): Three participants were randomly selected to be paid based on their stated 
preference for one pre-selected task (task #7). These participants were not aware at the time 
they took part in the experiment that they would be paid nor were they or any other 
participants aware of which task was the “real” task. All participants were informed of the 
incentive structure before agreeing to take part in the experiment, but they were not informed 
of the hypotheses as that may have biased the results. The three selected participants were 
contacted via email and paid through PayPal. 
While existing literature has been unable to show unambiguously that discount rates are 
influenced by real incentives, it also has not been able to rule it out (Frederick, Loewenstein 
and O’Donaghue, 2002). Therefore as a matter of caution this experiment used real 
incentives. This experiment was self-funded and limiting the number of paid participants was 
necessary due to budget limitations. 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four groups: The LP treatment group, the 
TLP treatment group, the AEP treatment group, and the control group. As the platform did not 
allow for true randomization, the first question asked participants during what part of the 
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month (first week, second week etc.) they were born, and based on their answers they were 
assigned to different groups.  
In the second part of the experiment, all participants were told that they had won the lottery 
and were asked to choose between a prize of 20/50/250 euro1 in 1 week/1 month/6 months 
and 40/100/500 euro in 1 month/6 months/12 months, which made for a total of nine 
intertemporal choice tasks. Different sized rewards were used as it has been shown (Thaler, 
1981) that the discount rate tends to fall as the size of the reward goes up, hence it seems 
within reason to suspect that demographic and treatment variables may have different impact 
on different sized rewards (i.e. some may only affect the lowest rewards, some only the 
highest). 
This experiment used choice tasks; that is, tasks where participants are asked to choose 
between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later reward. Such tasks provide less precision 
in measuring discount rates, yet they are preferable since they are the closest equivalent to the 
type of intertemporal choices faced by most consumers on a daily basis which consist of a 
choice between one fixed  amount  now  and  another  fixed  amount  at  a  specific  later  
point.  One option would have been to use “matching” tasks where participants are asked to 
match how much money they would need at a certain point in the future for it to be equivalent 
to a specific amount of money today. However such matching tasks, while they do provide 
precise measurements of discount rates, are very rare outside of experiments; there are very 
few if any real life situations where consumers are asked to “match” a certain amount in the 
future with another amount today. Because of this, as discussed by Frederick, Loewenstein 
and O’Donaghue (2002), consumers tend to rely on heuristics when solving matching tasks 
that they would not rely on outside of the experiment. Finally, matching tasks are relatively 
                                                          
1 Participants were provided with exchange rates for USD and SEK.   
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time consuming and may reduce the number of participants who actually complete the 
experiment and/or stay focused throughout its duration.  
In addition to matching tasks rating tasks were also considered, but ultimately deemed inferior 
to choice tasks as they, just like matching tasks, do not resemble any real life situation and 
additionally they may be sensitive to extremeness aversion (Tversky and Simonson, 1993). 
The number of tasks was kept at the relatively low number of nine for two reasons: First of all 
because survey completion rates have been shown to have a negative relationship with the 
number of questions (Galesic and Bosnjak, 2009) and secondly because the generalizability of 
the experiment would be reduced by too many tasks, as there are very few real life scenarios 
where a consumer would face dozens of intertemporal choices at once and little is known 
regarding whether consumers act differently when faced with a large number of choices 
compared to a small number.    
In the libertarian paternalist treatment group, the default option was set to the larger-later 
option and participants had to make an active choice by checking a box if they wanted the 
smaller-sooner option (meaning the treatment relied on the status quo bias).  
In the transparent libertarian paternalist treatment group, the default option was, just like in 
the LP treatment group, set to the larger-later option. However, participants in this treatment 
group were explicitly told about the default option and the purpose behind it (before the 
choice tasks there was a message written in all-caps conveying this information). As such, 
while the treatment still had a nudge, it had a greater degree of transparency and did not seek 
to unknowingly manipulate participants in the way the LP treatment did.  
In the AEP treatment group, nudges were foregone entirely in favor of providing participants 
with a list of reasons why they should choose the larger-later option (the list, together with the 
rest of the survey, can be found in the appendix). Participants were also asked which 
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argument they found the most convincing, and those who stated that they hadn’t read the list 
were not included in the regressions as they could not be considered part of the AEP group – 
one option would have been to include them in the control group, but this was rejected as 
there is no way to know whether they may have read (and as such been influenced) by a few 
of the reasons or whether they didn’t read any at all.  
Participants in the control group were neither provided with a list of arguments nor exposed to 
a default option.  
The third and final part of the survey was identical for all participants and consisted of 
demographic questions covering age, marital status, gender, education, in which part of the 
world the participant resided and whether the participant was currently enrolled at university 
(participants were not required to provide any identifying information). This section also 
asked questions regarding saving and the participant’s attitude towards it (see appendix for 
complete list). Notably, this survey did not ask for the annual income of participants, even 
though it is conceivable that it may affect the discount rate. This is for a number of reasons: 
First of all, a large number of participants – likely mainly those with low incomes – would be 
reluctant to provide that information. Secondly, what is considered a high income in one 
location may not be a high income in another location; a person making a high salary in 
Mexico may still make less than the average American. This issue exists even within 
countries; a salary high enough to afford a very comfortable lifestyle in rural US may not be 
nearly high enough to afford even a decent lifestyle in Manhattan or San Francisco. Thirdly, 
income is far from a perfect predictor of lifestyle; students for example generally have low 
incomes but also do not have the same expenses that adults out of college tend to have – 
students tend to save money by living in dorms or at home, most of them do not need a car as 
they live close to college, they receive student discounts in many shops etc. and may therefore 
appear poorer than they really are. The same can be said of retirees.  
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The final part of the survey also contained two trick questions designed to find out whether 
the participants had paid attention while reading the instructions of the survey (this was 
inspired by Haan and Linde, 2011). These questions were “How many participants who take 
this survey will be paid?” and “How many intertemporal choice scenarios (questions where 
you were asked to choose between a smaller-sooner and larger-later reward) were there on the 
previous page?” The answer to the first question was provided in the introduction to the 
survey, and to answer the second question the participant only needed to remember how many 
tasks he or she had just completed on the previous page.  
The second-to-last question asked participants for their email address so that they could be 
contacted and paid if they were one of the three selected participants. The last question was a 
comment field where participants could leave feedback and request to take part of the findings 
from the experiment. The “feedback form” was included for two reasons: First of all because 
this feedback may be used to improve the design of future experiments. Secondly because the 
feedback of some participants may indicate that they did not understand the experiment and 
their role in it, and in that case their data could be removed from the experiment before 
statistical analysis took place. 
As mentioned above the rewards in this experiment varied from 20, 50 and 250 euro for the 
smaller-sooner option to 40, 100 and 500 for the larger-later option (the smaller-sooner 
reward was always half of the larger-later reward). Given the magnitude effect (Thaler, 1981) 
we cannot expect smaller rewards to be discounted at the same rate as larger rewards, and it is 
conceivable to think that a treatment that works on a smaller (larger) reward may not work on 
a larger (smaller) reward, which is why this experiment used rewards of different sizes.  
Conducting this experiment online allowed for a larger and more diverse sample than 
traditional experiments conducted on college campuses. This experiment has 1552 
participants; more than one could reasonably fit into most rooms. The experiment was far 
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more diverse than most experiments, with hundreds of participants from all age group groups, 
both genders, married as well as non-married etc.  
The internet also provides a greater degree of anonymity than traditional lab experiments, 
potentially reducing the observer effect that otherwise may lead to participants acting 
unnaturally, which would reduce the generalizability of the results. Finally participation in an 
online experiment requires less time and effort on behalf of the participant, meaning even 
those who would not find it worthwhile to participate in a lab experiment may take the time to 
participate in this experiment, which reduces the self-selection problem associated with 
economic experiments.  
However, as identified by Wright (2005), an online experiment is also associated with 
drawbacks not present in a lab experiment: One and the same participant could potentially 
take the experiment multiple times, although this risk was mitigated by making it impossible 
to take the experiment multiple times from one and the same computer; meaning any 
“cheaters” would have to use separate computers or internet-connecting devices. Given the 
relatively low incentives in this experiment, it is highly unlikely that more than at most a few 
participants found this worthwhile.  
Participants may also be suspicious of the financial incentive and may suspect that the 
experiment is a scam. However, this risk was mitigated by reassuring participants in the 
introduction to the experiment that they would not have to provide any banking details to 
receive payment. There is also the issue of distractions; while in a lab experiment participants 
tend to be in a quiet room with nothing else to do than completing their tasks, this is not the 
case with in online experiment where participants may be distracted by other web content 
such as popup notifications. However, this does not necessarily have to be a negative feature 
as economic decisions are usually taken in “noisy” environments such as shopping centers, as 
such the “environment” provided by this experiment is closer to the kind of environment 
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where real life intertemporal choices are made. This experiment also allows participants to 
take part from the comfort of their own homes, possibly making them more relaxed and prone 
to act naturally. Hence, it could be argued that what seems to be a disadvantage is actually an 
advantage as it improves the generalizability of the experiment.  
Finally, conducting an intertemporal choice experiment online has the disadvantage of not 
being able to pay participants immediately upon completion as could be done in a lab 
experiment. As such, the shortest delay in an online intertemporal choice task cannot be zero 
if real incentives are to be used (as in this experiment), as many participants would certainly 
figure out that it would be impossible to pay rewards immediately and that tasks that gave the 
option of receiving money immediately were hypothetical. Therefore, the shortest delay in 
this experiment was set to one week. While this may mean that the experiment may fail to 
capture some of the “present bias”, this is not a grave concern as discount rates appear to be 
falling for at least one year from the present time (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donaghue, 
2002) and so most of the present bias is likely to still be present even though participants 
cannot choose to receive the reward immediately. 
  
15 
 
3. Results 
These results were obtained by running logistic regression using the responses to the 
intertemporal choice tasks as the dependent variables. As there were nine tasks, there are also 
nine dependent variables, all of them binary making them suitable for logistic regression. For 
the sake of simplicity the coefficients are expressed as odds ratios expressing the likelihood of 
a participant in the relevant group choosing the larger-later option for that particular task, 
relative to the likelihood of a participant in the control group making the same choice.  
After estimating the regression parameters, Wald tests were used to determine whether or not 
the LP treatment effect differed significantly (at a 5 % level) from the TLP or AEP treatment 
effect, and whether the TLP treatment effect differed significantly from the AEP treatment 
effect. 
From the total sample size of 1552 those who answered “I’d rather not say” to any of the 
demographic or personal choice questions were dropped if relevant to the regression (hence a 
person who did not wish to reveal their gender would be left in for regressions that did not 
include demographic variables). Additionally those in the AEP group who had indicated that 
they had not read the list of arguments provided were dropped. 
There are a total of four sets of regressions below2, first of all they differ in that two of the 
sets have no control variables while the other two sets contain control variables that 1) were 
correlated (at a 10 % significance level) with either of the treatment variables and 2) were not 
the type of control variable that may have been affected by the treatment (a participant who 
                                                          
2 Regressions were also run with only demographic (age, gender, marital status, location, 
whether a participant was currently a full-time student, and highest level of education 
achieved) control variables, with only personal choice control variables (whether or not an 
individual saves, thinks he/she should save more, if so why he doesn’t, whether he/she thinks 
saving is a moral obligation, whether he/she budgets, and whether or not he/she thinks he is 
influenced by framing and by psychologically manipulative advertising), and with both 
demographic and personal choice variables. 
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has just been exposed to the LP treatment may for example be more likely to concede being 
affected by psychological manipulation). The other difference is that for two of the sets all 
participants who failed either trick question were dropped, while for the other two sets only 
those who failed both questions were dropped. The reason for including the latter two sets is 
that it seems reasonable to assume that some of those who failed only one trick question may 
still have taken the experiment seriously but have paid too little attention to remember the 
instructions (in which they could find the answers to the trick questions). In the real world 
many consumer decisions (especially those involving low amounts of money) are taken by 
consumers while they are not paying full attention, and the inclusion of these two sets can 
provide insights on the effect of different treatments on consumers decisions made while 
consumers are not being fully attentive.  
In the regression output, below, LP refers to libertarian paternalism; TLP refers to transparent 
libertarian paternalism, AEP to autonomy-enhancing paternalism, MCoT to the Marginal Cost 
of Transparency, and Wald refers to the likelihood of achieving the Wald statistic when 
testing the hypothesis that LP equals AEP/TLP or that TLP equals AEP. Results significant at 
a 5 % level are in bold. 
Table 1: Data summary 
To find the percentage of the sample that belonged to a specific group, simply multiply by 
100 (i.e. 27.51 % of the sample were in the control group). 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
control 0.2751289 other 0.0167526 
lp 0.2113402 married 0.4162371 
tlp 0.2164948 student 0.1082474 
aep 0.2970361 incentiveright 0.5296392 
onemonth40 0.9246134 icsright 0.3627577 
onemonth100 0.9278351 yessavemore 0.4664948 
onemonth500 0.9130155 nomoney 0.2474227 
sixmonths40 0.7532216 motivation 0.1681701 
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sixmonths100 0.7951031 forgetfulness 0.0367505 
sixmonths500 0.8530928 male 0.8305412 
    
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
twelvemonths40 0.8627577 yesmanipulated 0.3054124 
twelvemonths100 0.8820876 highschool 0.2893041 
twelvemonths500 0.8853093 undergrad 0.2358247 
age1823 0.0708763 postgrad 0.4104381 
age2435 0.1475515 savepension 0.0760309 
age3664 0.6204897 saveprivate 0.5831186 
ageover64 0.1507732 yesframing 0.5921392 
weuropeaus 0.8833763 yesmoral 0.4072165 
nonweurope 0.0296392 yesbudget 0.5708763 
northamerica 0.0579897 email 0.6082474 
 
 
Table 2: Control variables included, participants who failed either trick question 
dropped 
OddsLOGIT =p([reward]=1)/1-p([reward]=1)) = e
B
n
X (where X includes lp, aep, tlp, age1823 
ageover64, student, highschool, postgrad, yesbudget, email) 
One week vs one month, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 3.0463 2.0095 6.9769 1.0368 0.5842 0.3822 0.153 
SD 2.0675 1.1498 5.5519     
P>|z|   0.101 0.223 0.015     
        
        
One week vs one month, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.2856 2.447 3.1745 -0.1613 0.9354 0.7005 0.7594 
SD 1.5967 1.7053 2.2229     
P>|z|   0.237 0.199 0.099     
        
        
One week vs one month, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.3887 1.7606 10.578 -0.3719 0.7083 0.0656 0.1075 
SD 0.7657 1.0174 11.2783     
P>|z|   0.552 0.328 0.027     
        
        
One month vs six months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.5726 2.4192 1.1568 -0.8466 0.3113 0.4248 0.0663 
SD 0.5848 0.9479 0.3985     
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P>|z|   0.223 0.024 0.672     
        
        
One month vs six months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.9744 3.7564 1.48 -1.782 0.1885 0.4873 0.0449 
SD 0.7725 1.674 0.5325     
P>|z|   0.082 0.003 0.276     
        
        
One month vs six months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.6449 1.8067 3.117 -0.162 0.8467 0.3043 0.2316 
SD 0.7092 0.77562 1.4889     
P>|z|   0.248 0.168 0.017     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.024 1.7693 0.41 -0.7453 0.362 0.0531 0.0083 
SD 0.514 1.026 0.1797     
P>|z|   0.962 0.325 0.042     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.541 4.1372 0.9093 -1.5962 0.519 0.0734 0.0254 
SD 1.4311 2.7654 0.4049     
P>|z|   0.098 0.034 0.831     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.3383 1.3322 2.529 0.006 0.9929 0.2825 0.2776 
SD 0.6348 0.6289 1.4148     
P>|z|   0.539 0.543 0.097     
 
 
These results suggest, contrary to the first hypothesis of this experiment, that there is no 
marginal cost of transparency. There is little indication that the transparent libertarian 
paternalist treatment fares any worse than the standard LP treatment. Only in one case (the 
first task) in two sets of regressions does the LP treatment outperform the TLP treatment as 
measured by the Wald test – whether this is merely statistical noise or due to there actually 
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being an initial cost of transparency that “wears off” rapidly as the participants move on 
through the tasks one cannot tell with certainty based on this experiment.  
It is noteworthy however that the TLP treatment outperforms the LP treatment in the 
regression sets where all participants who failed either trick question have been dropped. This 
suggests that TLP works better when participants pay more attention, which at first seems 
counterintuitive as those who are not paying attention ought to be more likely to miss the 
disclaimer revealing the existence and purpose of the default option nudge. In other words, it 
appears the disclaimer has if anything a positive impact on the efficacy of the nudge.  
This brings us to the question of how consumers can be nudged even when they know that 
they are being nudged. The likeliest explanation in my view is that during any LP treatment, 
some people will figure out that they are being manipulated and “lash out” against the choice 
architect by actively doing the opposite of what the architect wants. In this case, once a 
participant realizes that the choice architect is trying to manipulate him/her to choose the 
larger-later option, and out of resentment over this manipulation, he/she then chooses the 
smaller-sooner option. Gustavsson (2016) showed that the effect of an LP treatment could 
backfire if repeated enough times, presumably as more and more participants figure out what 
the choice architect is doing and lash out against it.  
Why does this backlash not occur with the TLP? Quite simply nudging appears to be a case 
where honesty pays. By informing the participants that there is a nudge and why, participants 
no longer feel the need to “lash out” against the choice architect once they found out, as they 
don’t experience the same feeling of having been deceived and manipulated. 
It also cannot be ruled out that participants are still affected by the default option on a 
psychological level even though they know why it is there, similar to how humans can 
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experience a placebo effect even when they know that they are taking a placebo (Schafer, 
Colloca and Wager, 2015).  
Finally, it seems plausible that the disclaimer, which again states that there is a nudge to 
induce participants to choose the larger-later option, induces participants to think of reasons 
why they should choose the larger-later option, even though (unlike in the AEP group), no 
arguments are provided. It can be assumed that most people know of at least one reason to 
save of the top of their head, and the disclaimer may cause them to think of this reason(s). 
It is worth keeping in mind that a large proportion of the participants in this survey are 
Swedish3. While English proficiency in Sweden is very high it cannot be ruled out that some 
participants in the TLP group did not understand the meaning of the disclaimer informing 
them about the nudge. It is however unlikely that this had any greater effect on the results as it 
is unlikely that many participants simultaneously had a such a poor grasp of English that they 
could not understand the disclaimer while simultaneously a good enough grasp of English to 
pass both trick questions.  
Turning attention to the AEP treatment, there is a great difference between the two sets where 
participants needed only to have passed one trick question and those where they needed to 
have passed both. AEP has a great effect in the latter case, likely because (as discussed) these 
participants were paying more attention to the experiment, which likely translated to paying 
more attention to the list of arguments provided in the AEP treatment. It should not come as a 
surprise to anyone that in order for a list of arguments to be effective in convincing a 
consumer to pursue a certain course of action, the consumer has to pay attention to the 
arguments.  
                                                          
3 This was a side effect of extensive promotion of the experiment on Swedish-language websites.  
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The AEP treatment also appears to work better when rewards are large. This may be because 
participants are more likely to stop and consider their actions carefully when large amounts 
are at stake. This may have made the list of arguments they had just been provided more 
persuasive as with the smaller rewards participants may have simply not bothered to think too 
hard about the decision and instead just used their intuition. 
In summary what these results suggest is that honest nudges do work, and that reasoning with 
consumers may work even better provided that stakes are high enough and that consumers are 
paying attention.  
Moving on to the demographic variables, first it should be noted that the randomization was 
generally successful with few demographic groups being overrepresented among the 
treatment groups. The correlation coefficients indicate that those aged 18-23 and those who 
are students are significantly less likely to choose the larger-later option for seven out of nine 
tasks (after removing participants who failed both trick questions). There is a severe overlap 
making it difficult to distinguish between these two groups, and as such we cannot tell 
whether people aged 18-23 are less patient because they are students, or the students are less 
patient because they are aged 18-23. It is interesting however to note that not only are students 
less patient, but they also appear to think about saving in a different way, being less likely to 
think of saving as a moral obligation and also less likely to think that people in general should 
save more. One question in the last section of the survey asked participants whether their 
attitude towards saving had become more positive, more negative or stayed the same as they 
had become older, and an overwhelming majority responded that they had become more 
positive to saving as they had aged, which is consistent with these findings. Mischel and 
Metzner (1962) found that discount rates were negatively correlated with age at least until the 
age of 12 (their sample used children aged 5-12), while Steinberg et al (2009) found that 
discount rates keep falling at least until the age of 16. This study suggests that discount rates 
22 
 
continue to fall even once individuals have reached the age of legal adulthood, and may 
stabilize only sometime in the mid-early 20’s.  
It is also interesting to note that holding a postgraduate degree is positively correlated with the 
discount rate while holding an undergraduate degree is not. In economic terms an education is 
an investment, and so one would reasonably expect that anyone who invested more than the 
bare legal minimum in education would have a lower discount rate compared to those who 
don’t. How then could it be that undergraduate degree holders are no more patient than those 
who do not hold a degree? There are several reasons that may contribute to this: First of all 
while attending college is an investment, it is far from certain that all students think of it that 
way. Some students may attend college not to increase their lifetime income, but instead to 
experience college life and achieve personal development (to these people, college is not a 
sacrifice as it leads to short-term gratification). Additionally many students may have been 
pressured (or possibly bribed) into attending college by their parents, in which case them 
attending college isn’t a reflection on their own economic patience but rather that of their 
parents. Holding a postgraduate degree is not associated with a lower discount rate in the 
tasks with short delays (one week vs one month), which makes sense as the decision to pursue 
a postgraduate degree is typically made several months in advance of actually commencing 
the degree and so does not involve the “present bias” component of the discount rate.  
Not surprisingly, participants who state that they save privately are more likely to choose the 
larger-later option, while those who save through pension plans are not. This may be because 
a many pension plans have the contributions deducted automatically from the paychecks of 
the participants, meaning they don’t have to make an active choice every month not to spend 
all the money that they are paid.  
Counterintuitively, participants who state that they budget their consumption have higher 
discount rates than those who don’t. At first appearance this may seem strange as budgeting is 
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a choice one would normally associate with patience and the ability to plan ahead. One 
possible explanation is that participants who budget their consumption are aware that they 
suffer from a present bias. They are, as O’Donaghue and Rabin (1999) put it, sophisticated 
consumers who are aware of their short-comings and attempt to plan ahead to stop their 
“future selves” from making the wrong decisions. This explanation is further supported by the 
fact that believing that one should save more than one currently does is associated with a 
higher, not a lower discount rate – clearly there are a lot of economically impatient 
participants who are aware that their behavior isn’t optimal. Another explanation is that 
consumers with lower incomes may be more prone to budgeting (as they have to be more 
careful not to overspend), and these participants would also be more likely to choose the 
smaller-sooner option as they are liquidity constrained. These explanations are obviously not 
mutually exclusive. 
Being married is positively correlated with choosing the larger-later options in for 3 out of 9 
tasks. It may be that being in a team with another individual that one cares about induces 
more careful, patient decision-making, but it may also be the case that patient individuals are 
more likely to get married, that the maturity that comes with age acts both to reduce discount 
rates (as indicated by this experiment) and to increase the likelihood of getting married, or 
that having two incomes (as most married couples have) means they can afford to save. 
Further research is necessary in this area.  
Contrary to the findings of Silverman (2003) and McLeish and Oxoby (2007), the results from 
this experiment indicate that men are more patient than women. It is conceivable to think that 
this may be due to women earning less than men and thus being more prone to being liquidity 
constrained (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007). Liquidity constraint due to lower income 
is also a probable explanation as for why participants in the non-western parts of Europe are 
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less patient than those in Western Europe; these regions, being poorer, likely have more 
consumers who are liquidity constrained.  
Cubitt and Read (2007) question whether time preferences cab be properly elicited through 
experiments. The time preferences expressed in this experiment are largely consistent with the 
expectations of economic theory, with savers having lower discount rates than non-savers, 
retirees having high discount rates due to dis-saving, those with advanced degrees having low 
discount rates etc. Hence, while other experiments may suffer from a lack of generalizability 
due to homogenous samples, self-selection and a range of other issues, this experiment 
appears to have succeeded in replicating the kind of savings behavior one would expect from 
different groups, meaning it is likely that the effects from the different treatments as shown in 
this experiment would also carry over to the real world.  
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Conclusions 
These results indicate that nudging can work even if conducted in an open, transparent 
manner. While that may be seen as a victory for libertarian paternalism, if we accept these 
results it also means that the way that nudges are commonly being used today – without 
transparency – is not just an ethically questionable way of changing consumer behavior, but 
an ethically questionable way that carries no gain as the same results can be achieved through 
transparent means. 
Furthermore, these findings also suggest that AEP under the right circumstances can be even 
better than LP/TLP, and it can be argued that if the same or similar results can be obtained 
using an AEP treatment, then an AEP treatment should be used as it relies on informing 
consumers. TLP, while more ethical than LP, still will not teach a consumer anything he or 
she did not already know, and when the TLP nudge is gone, the consumer’s behavior is 
almost certain to reverse. 
Judging from the results of this experiment, the problem with AEP interventions is that they 
require consumers to pay attention for them to be effective while LP interventions seem to 
work regardless (which makes sense as AEP still requires an active choice). From a policy 
standpoint, this means that AEP interventions should mainly be used when one can be 
reasonably assured that consumers will be paying attention, and they should be designed in 
such a way as to grab attention. Finally, it is important to note that some AEP interventions 
may be less reliant on consumers paying attention to them (such as mandatory cooling off 
periods). 
Future research will investigate whether there may be a marginal cost of transparency in 
contexts other than intertemporal choice as this experiment cannot tell us whether consumers 
would act the same way outside of an intertemporal choice context. This is something that 
needs to be ascertained before TLP interventions can be used widely by policy-makers. 
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Likewise, future experiments will focus on determining whether TLP and match LP using 
other nudges than the default option nudge. Future experiments will also be provided in 
several languages to ensure that all participants understand the instructions. Finally, future 
experiments will further investigate the link between age and savings behavior to find out 
whether there is a causal link between them.  
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Appendix A: Survey 
Welcome! 
My name is John Gustavsson and I’m a PhD student at Maynooth University at the 
Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting.  
This survey is an experiment that is part of the research I am doing for my doctoral thesis. In 
this survey, you will be asked a number of questions about how you value future income 
relative to present income – what we economists call “inter-temporal choice”.  
You will be posed with a number of scenarios and asked how you would act in them (there 
will be two options in each scenario). These are not purely hypothetical scenarios; three (3) of 
you who answer this survey will be paid in accordance with how you answer one (1) of the 
scenarios. The three who are paid will be randomly selected; your answers have no bearing 
whatsoever on your likelihood of being one of them.  
The final part of this survey contains demographic questions (age, gender, what part of the 
world you live in, education level, whether you are currently a student and marital status) as 
well as some questions on consumer behavior and attitudes. If you are uncomfortable with 
answering a demographic question, simply choose the option “I’d rather not say” (or write 
N/A in the box) which is provided for every demographic question. All data will be stored in 
a password-protected folder stored in the university system, and there will be no further use of 
the data beyond this study. 
You will be asked to provide me with your email address at the end of the survey – this is so 
that I can contact you in case you are one of those who have been selected to be paid. You are 
not required to provide your email address, but if you don’t I won’t be able to pay you. You 
will not need to provide your bank account details to receive payment. The email addresses 
will be stored (in a separate password-protected folder) only until the selected participants 
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have been paid, while the rest of the data will be retained for research purposes. You may quit 
the survey at any time; if you quit before finishing the survey, your data will be deleted. You 
can also withdraw your data at any time by emailing me at the email address provided below.  
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and records 
may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation by 
lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within 
law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest possible extent. 
If you’re interested in learning the findings of this study you’re more than welcome to do so; 
simply indicate your interest when answering the final question.  
If you have any questions or you wish to contact me for any reason, you can reach me at 
john.gustavsson.2010@mumail.ie.  
You must be 18 or older to participate in this survey. This survey will take approximately 15 
minutes to complete, obviously depending on how much time you spend thinking about your 
decisions. Please read the descriptions on the next page carefully. 
By proceeding, you agree to take part in this survey, and have your data stored under the 
conditions outlined above. Thank you for your participation! 
Q1: What time of the month is your birthday? 
Between the 1st and 7th of the month 
Between the 8th and 14th of the month 
Between the 15th and 21st of the month 
After the 22nd of the month 
CONTROL GROUP 
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NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 euro equals 
approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q2: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in one month, or 20 euro in 
one week. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one week 
40 euro in one month 
Q3: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in one month, or 50 euro 
in one week. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one week 
100 euro in one month 
Q4: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in one month, or 250 euro 
in one week. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in one month 
Q5: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in six months, or 20 euro in 
one month. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one month 
40 euro in six months 
Q6: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in six months, or 50 euro 
in one month. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one month 
100 euro in six months 
Q7: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in six months, or 250 euro 
in one month. What do you choose? 
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250 euro in one month 
500 euro in six months 
Q8: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in twelve months, or 20 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
20 euro in six months 
40 euro in twelve months 
Q9: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in twelve months, or 50 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
50 euro in six months 
100 euro in twelve months 
Q10: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in twelve months, or 250 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
250 euro in six months 
500 euro in twelve months 
AEP TREATMENT GROUP 
Below, you will be presented with a number of scenarios – you will be asked to choose 
between a smaller reward received soon, and a larger reward received later. Before you make 
your choices, here are a few things that I would like you to take into account: 
1) Choosing the “later” option means you have something to look forward to. 
2) Saving means you’ll be better off in the event of a “rainy day” 
3) Every decision that we make is influenced by the choices we’ve made in the past. By 
choosing the larger-later option now, it’ll be easier to do the same in the future – you can 
establish (or strengthen an already existing) good habit. 
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4) The interest rate is 100 %, or to put it another way on an annual basis in the first three 
scenarios (one week vs one month, see below) the interest rate is 170 681%, while in the 
second (one month vs six months) and last third (six months vs twelve months) of the 
scenarios it is 428 % and 300 % respectively. 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 euro equals 
approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q11: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in one month, or 20 euro 
in one week. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one week 
40 euro in one month 
Q12: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in one month, or 50 euro 
in one week. What do you choose? 
50 euro in one week 
100 euro in one month 
Q13: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in one month, or 250 
euro in one week. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in one month 
Q14: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in six months, or 20 euro 
in one month. What do you choose? 
20 euro in one month 
40 euro in six months 
Q15: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in six months, or 50 euro 
in one month. What do you choose? 
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50 euro in one month 
100 euro in six months 
Q16: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in six months, or 250 
euro in one month. What do you choose? 
250 euro in one month 
500 euro in six months 
Q17: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 40 euro in twelve months, or 20 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
20 euro in six months 
40 euro in twelve months 
Q18: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 100 euro in twelve months, or 50 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
50 euro in six months 
100 euro in twelve months 
Q19: You win the lottery and your prize is to receive either 500 euro in twelve months, or 250 
euro in six months. What do you choose? 
250 euro in six months 
500 euro in twelve months 
 
Q20: Which argument in favor of choosing the larger-later option did you find the most 
convincing?  
The “Something to look forward to”-argument 
The “Rainy day”-argument 
The “good habit”-argument 
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The interest rate-argument 
No difference 
I didn’t find any argument convincing 
I didn’t read them 
LP TREATMENT GROUP 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling.  40 euro equals 
approximately 88 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
Q21: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in one month, or 20 euro in 
one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q22: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in one month, or 50 euro in 
one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q23: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in one month, or 250 euro 
in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q24: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in six months, or 20 euro in 
one month. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q25: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in six months, or 50 euro in 
one month. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
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Q26: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in six months, or 250 euro 
in one month. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q27: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in twelve months, or 20 euro 
in six months. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q28: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in twelve months, or 50 
euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q29: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in twelve months, or 250 
euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
TLP TREATMENT GROUP 
BEFORE YOU PROCEED, BE AWARE THAT THE DEFAULT OPTION FOR THIS 
SECTION IS THE LARGER-LATER OPTION (RECEIVING 40/100/500 EURO AFTER A 
LONGER DELAY RATHER THAN 20/50/250 AFTER A SHORTER). DEFAULT 
OPTIONS ARE KNOWN TO AFFECT THE DECISIONS MADE BY CONSUMERS AND 
THE DEFAULT OPTION HAS BEEN SET THIS WAY TO HELP YOU MAKE GOOD, 
FORWARD-LOOKING CHOICES. 
NOTE: 20 euro equals approximately 22 USD, 195 SEK or 18 Pound sterling. 40 euro equals 
approximately 44 USD, 390 SEK or 36 Pound Sterling. 
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Q30: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in one month, or 20 euro in 
one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q31: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in one month, or 50 euro in 
one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q32: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in one month, or 250 euro 
in one week. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one week, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q33: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in six months, or 20 euro in 
one month. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q34: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in six months, or 50 euro in 
one month. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q35: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in six months, or 250 euro 
in one month. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in one month, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q36: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 40 euro in twelve months, or 20 euro 
in six months. If you would prefer to receive 20 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
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Q37: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 100 euro in twelve months, or 50 
euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 50 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
Q38: You’ve won the lottery and your prize is to receive 500 euro in twelve months, or 250 
euro in six months. If you would prefer to receive 250 euro in six months, please tick this box. 
[] 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
Q39: Please state your age 
18-23 
24-35 
36-64 
65+ 
I’d rather not say 
Q40: What part of the world do you reside in?  
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Southern Europe 
North America 
Central America 
Australia/NZ/Oceania 
Southeast Asia 
Middle east 
Africa 
South America 
I’d rather not say 
Q41: Are you married? 
Yes 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q42: Are you a full-time student (or a graduate of the class of 2016)? 
Yes 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q43: How many participants who take this survey will be paid? 
1 
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3 
5 
6 
7 
 
Q44: Thinking about your personal finances, do you think you should save more than you 
currently do? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
I’d rather not say 
Q45: If Yes, why don’t you? 
I don’t feel like I can afford it 
Lack of motivation 
Forgetfulness 
Other/I’d rather not say 
Q46: What gender do you identify as? 
Male 
Female 
I’d rather not say 
Q47: Do you think you are prone to be affected by psychologically manipulative tactics (such 
as those commonly employed by advertisers) when making consumer decisions 
Yes 
No 
I don’t know 
Q48: What is the highest level of education that you have achieved? 
High school/Post-primary school or less 
Undergraduate degree 
Postgraduate degree/Postgraduate diploma 
I’d rather not say 
Q49: Do you currently save regularly? 
Yes, through a pension plan 
Yes, privately/both privately and through a pension plan 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q50: How many intertemporal choice scenarios (questions where you were asked to choose 
between a smaller-sooner and larger-later reward) were there on the previous page? 
7 
6 
9 
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12 
15 
Q51: Do you think that your consumer choices are affected by the order that the options (such 
as, items in a shop) are presented in? 
Yes 
No 
I don’t know 
Q52: Do you think people in general should save more, less or about the same as now? 
More 
Same 
Less 
No opinion 
Q53: Do you think that saving is a moral obligation for those who are able to save? 
Yes 
No 
Q54: Do you usually plan your consumption ahead of time (budgeting)? 
Yes 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q55: Thinking back, do you think your attitude towards saving and whether it’s important has 
changed as you’ve grown older? 
Yes, I’m more positive to saving today than when I was younger 
Yes, I’m more negative to saving today than when I was younger 
No 
I’d rather not say 
Q56: Please provide your email address in the field below (this is voluntary but it’s necessary 
for you to have a chance to be paid as I need to be able to get in touch with you). 
Q57: Do you have any comments, questions or feedback in general? If you would like to take 
part of the findings from this study, please indicate this here. 
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Appendix B: Terminology 
 
Terminology: 
control 1 if participant in control group, 0 otherwise.  
lp 1 if participant in libertarian paternalist treatment group, 0 otherwise. 
aep 1 if participant in autonomy-enhancing paternalist treatment group, 0 
otherwise. 
tlp 1 if participant in transparent libertarian paternalist treatment group, 0 
otherwise. 
Onemonth40 1 if participant chose 40 euro in 1 month over 20 euro in 1 week, 0 
otherwise. 
Onemonth100 1 if participant chose 100 euro in 1 month over 50 euro in 1 week, 0 
otherwise.  
Onemonth500 1 if participant chose 500 euro in 1 month over 250 euro in 1 week, 0 
otherwise. 
Sixmonths40 1 if participant chose 40 euro in 6 months over 20 euro in 1 month, 0 
otherwise. 
Sixmonths100 1 if participant chose 100 euro in 6 months over 50 euro in 1 month, 0 
otherwise. 
Sixmonths500 1 if participant chose 500 euro in 6 months over 250 euro in 1 month, 
0 otherwise. 
Twelvemonths40 1 if participant chose 40 euro in 12 months over 20 euro in 6 months, 0 
otherwise. 
Twelvemonths100 1 if participant chose 100 euro in 12 months over 250 euro in 6 
months, 0 otherwise. 
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Twelvemonths500 1 if participant chose 500 euro in 12 months over 250 euro in 6 
months, 0 otherwise 
Age1823 1 if participant is between the ages 18-23, 0 otherwise. 
Age2435 1 if participant is between the ages 24-35, 0 otherwise. 
Age3664 1 if participant is between the ages 36-64, 0 otherwise. 
Ageover64 1 if participant is above the age of 64, 0 otherwise.  
weuropeaus 1 if participant resides in Western Europe, Australia or New Zealand, 
0 otherwise. 
nonweurope 1 if participant resides in Europe but not in western Europe, 0 
otherwise. 
northamerica 1 if participant resides in North America, 0 otherwise. 
other 1 if participant resides elsewhere, 0 otherwise. 
married 1 if participant is married, 0 otherwise. 
student 1 if participant is a student or a graduate of the class of 2016, 0 
otherwise. 
incentiveright 1 if participant gave the correct answer to the trick question asking 
how many participants were to be paid, 0 otherwise. 
icsright 1 if participant gave the correct answer to the trick question asking 
how many intertemporal choice scenarios they had completed, 0 
otherwise. 
yessavemore 1 if participant thinks he or she should save more, 0 otherwise.  
nomoney 1 if participant states the reason he or she does not save more is due to 
lack of money, 0 otherwise.  
motivation 1 if participant states the reason he or she does not save more is due to 
lack of motivation, 0 otherwise.  
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forgetfulness 1 if participant states the reason he or she does not save more is due to 
forgetfulness, 0 otherwise.  
male 1 if participant is male, 0 otherwise.   
yesmanipulated 1 if participant states he or she believes that he or she believes he or 
she is affected by psychologically manipulative tactics in 
advertisement, 0 otherwise 
highschool 1 if the highest level of education attained by the participant is a high 
school degree or less, 0 otherwise.  
undergrad 1 if the highest level of education attained by the participant is an 
undergraduate degree, 0 otherwise.  
postgrad 1 if the highest level of education attained by the participant is a 
postgraduate degree, 0 otherwise. 
savepension 1 if participant saves through a pension plan, 0 otherwise. 
saveprivate 1 if participant saves privately or both privately and in a pension plan, 
0 otherwise. 
yesframing 1 if participant states he or she believes that his or her choices are 
affected by framing, 0 otherwise. 
yesmoral 1 if participant states he or she believes it is a moral obligation for 
those who can to save, 0 otherwise. 
yesbudget 1 if participant states that he or she plans his or spending ahead of 
time, 0 otherwise. 
email 1 if participant provided his or her email address, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix C: Additional regressions 
 
Table 3: Control variables included, participants who failed both trick questions 
dropped 
OddsLOGIT =p([reward]=1)/1-p([reward]=1)) = e
B
n
X (where X includes lp, aep, tlp, age2435, 
age3664, undergrad, yesbudget) 
One week vs one month, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.4556 0.7028 1.769 0.7528 0.0965 0.6894 0.0227 
SD 0.6494 0.2479 0.7324     
P>|z|   0.4 0.317 0.168     
        
        
One week vs one month, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.575 0.9774 1.1708 0.5974 0.3253 0.5353 0.6525 
SD 0.7423 0.3827 0.4504     
P>|z|   0.335 0.953 0.682     
        
        
One week vs one month, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 0.7172 0.805 1.8736 -0.088 0.7467 0.0201 0.038 
SD 0.2565 0.2817 0.7646     
P>|z|   0.353 0.535 0.124     
        
        
One month vs six months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.6963 1.6406 0.9477 0.0557 0.894 0.011 0.0115 
SD 0.3919 0.3593 0.1845     
P>|z|   0.022 0.024 0.782     
        
        
One month vs six months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.2599 1.6805 1.0127 0.5794 0.2907 0.0018 0.0288 
SD 0.5821 0.3902 0.2067     
P>|z|   0.002 0.025 0.951     
        
        
One month vs six months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.2405 1.2234 1.4811 0.0171 0.9617 0.5328 0.481 
SD 0.3358 0.3139 0.3747     
P>|z|   0.426 0.432 0.12     
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Six months vs twelve months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.4374 1.2472 0.557 0.1902 0.6693 0.0012 0.0028 
SD 0.4462 0.3602 0.1353     
P>|z|   0.242 0.444 0.016     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.3943 1.5685 0.8717 0.8258 0.253 0.0027 0.0379 
SD 0.817 0.4516 0.2135     
P>|z|   0.011 0.118 0.575     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 0.9786 0.6883 1.2055 0.2903 0.2286 0.4926 0.0427 
SD 0.2909 0.185 0.3404     
P>|z|   0.942 0.165 0.508     
 
Table 4: No control variables, participants who failed both trick questions dropped 
OddsLOGIT =p([reward]=1)/1-p([reward]=1)) = e
B
n
X (where X includes lp, aep, tlp) 
One week vs one month, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.3178 0.7385 1.4797 0.5793 0.1353 0.7825 0.0587 
SD 0.5189 0.2494 0.5534     
P>|z|   0.483 0.369 0.295     
        
        
One week vs one month, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.7291 1.1038 0.9875 0.6253 0.3287 0.1974 0.7666 
SD 0.7582 0.419 0.3447     
P>|z|   0.212 0.795 0.971     
        
        
One week vs one month, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 0.7352 0.8776 1.5679 -0.1424 0.6019 0.0396 0.1218 
SD 0.2454 0.2997 0.5803     
P>|z|   0.357 0.702 0.224     
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One month vs six months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.0571 1.8153 1.1033 0.2417 0.5976 0.0038 0.0158 
SD 0.443 0.3749 0.1999     
P>|z|   0.001 0.004 0.587     
        
        
One month vs six months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.6906 1.7628 1.1227 0.9278 0.1143 0.0004 0.0391 
SD 0.6603 0.3846 0.2139     
P>|z|   0 0.009 0.543     
        
        
One month vs six months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.5062 1.3307 1.4588 0.1755 0.6534 0.7195 0.9046 
SD 0.3846 0.3249 0.3408     
P>|z|   0.109 0.242 0.106     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.6833 1.4 0.6339 0.2833 0.5594 0.0004 0.002 
SD 0.4882 0.3807 0.1416     
P>|z|   0.073 0.216 0.041     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.4353 1.6266 0.9007 0.8087 0.2434 0.0014 0.0288 
SD 0.7682 0.449 0.2072     
P>|z|   0.005 0.078 0.65     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 0.9727 0.7373 1.0524 0.2354 0.3185 0.7788 0.1745 
SD 0.2731 0.1935 0.2792     
P>|z|   0.921 0.246 0.847     
 
Table 5: No control variables, participants who failed either trick question dropped 
OddsLOGIT =p([reward]=1)/1-p([reward]=1)) = e
B
n
X (where X includes lp, aep, tlp) 
One week vs one month, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.6707 2.1366 5.9268 0.5341 0.7467 0.3655 0.2312 
49 
 
SD 1.6007 1.1881 4.6209     
P>|z|   0.101 0.172 0.022     
        
        
One week vs one month, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.6118 2.6471 2.0912 -0.0353 0.9871 0.7758 0.7627 
SD 1.79 1.8138 1.2984     
P>|z|   0.161 0.155 0.235     
        
        
One week vs one month, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.0268 1.7381 9.7619 -0.7113 0.3758 0.0359 0.1191 
SD 0.5148 0.9918 10.35     
P>|z|   0.958 0.333 0.032     
        
        
One month vs six months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.6918 2.5806 1.0705 -0.8889 0.2983 0.1998 0.0218 
SD 0.5858 0.9645 0.3423     
P>|z|   0.129 0.011 0.831     
        
        
One month vs six months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 2.0886 3.7121 1.3364 -1.6235 0.2323 0.2619 0.0241 
SD 0.7909 1.6187 0.4566     
P>|z|   0.052 0.003 0.396     
        
        
One month vs six months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.7260 1.9562 2.6969 -0.2301 0.7899 0.3667 0.5232 
SD 0.7061 0.8207 1.2050     
P>|z|   0.182 0.11 0.026     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 40 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.0013 1.9349 0.4464 -0.9336 0.2583 0.0667 0.0057 
SD 0.4789 1.0888 0.1847     
P>|z|   0.998 0.241 0.051     
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Six months vs twelve months, 100 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.8992 4.0123 0.8642 -2.1132 0.3031 0.1311 0.0203 
SD 0.9869 2.6492 0.3671     
P>|z|   0.217 0.035 0.731     
        
        
Six months vs twelve months, 500 euro     
 LP TLP AEP MCoT WaldLP/TLP WaldLP/AEP WaldTLP/AEP 
Coef 1.2126 1.2305 2.0597 -0.0178 0.9768 0.3378 0.3511 
SD 0.5624 0.5704 1.0681     
P>|z|   0.678 0.655 0.164     
 
